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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

CONFLICT OF LAWS AS TO CONTRACTS THE RESTATEMENT AND MINNESOTA DECISIONS
COMPARED
By HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK*

N a former article1 the Minnesota cases dealing with the conflict
of laws as to contracts were summarized. Since that article appeared the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws containing the chapter on contracts 2 has been published,
and it is the purpose of the present article to compare that Restatement with the Minnesota cases.
The first topic of the chapter in the Restatement deals with
the place of contracting. The first section 3 defines the term "place
of contracting" as meaning "the state where the agreement was
made." In the case of Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer,4 our court, after stating the rule to be well settled that
personal contracts are to have the same validity, interpretation,
and obligatory force in every other country (unless against its
public policy) which'they have in the country where they were
made, continued
"The lex loci contractus (referring to the place of the seat

of the contract as distinguished from the place where it may
casually happen fo have been signed) is prima facie that which
the parties intended to apply "I
From this it would seem that our court uses the term "lex

loci contractus" or its English equivalent "law of the place where
the contract is made" as synonymous with Dicey's term "proper
law of the contract,"' and the use of either of those terms in a case
where the court is considering only the question whether the law of
the forum or the proper law of the contract shall govern, does not

make that case authority

for the proposition that the law of

*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
"McClintock, Conflict of Laws as to Contracts: Minnesota Decisions
2 (1926)

10 MINNFSOTA LAW REVIEw 498.

American Law Institute, Tentative Restatement No. 4 of the
Conflict of Laws, Chapter 8. (1928). Hereafter this draft will be
cited simply as the Restatement.
sSection 332.
4 (1892) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W 1137 38 Am. St. Rep. 536.
5
1n Swedish-Amer. Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, (1903) 89 Minn.
98, 111, 94 N. W 218, 61 L. R. A. 448, there is a similar definition
of "lex loci contractus."
eDicey, Conflict of Laws, 4th ed., p. 591.
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the place where the contract is entered into is the proper law
of the contract.7
Section 333 of the Restatement reads as follows
"A contract is made in the state where the last act toward
the completion of the contract is done by a party to the contract,
or by an agent who makes a contract for a principal."
In Walsh v. Selover, Bates & Co., this proposition was presented to our court for decision. An earlier case? had held that
the Minnesota statute for termination by notice of a contract for
the purchase of lands, applied to a contract for the sale of lands
situated in another state where the contract was made and performable here, between parties domiciled here. In the later case
the facts were the same except that the purchaser was domiciled
in North Dakota and there signed the contract and mailed it to
the vendor, who was in Minnesota. Counsel for the purchaser
expressly argued that the signing of the contract was the last
act necessary to make it binding and, since that occurred in another state,-the Minnesota statute did not apply. Vendor's counsel argued both that the contract was completed by negotiations
and payment of a deposit in Minneapolis, and that the law of
the place where it was casually entered into did not govern.
The court, in holding that the case was not distinguishable from
the Finies Case, said.
"The fact that the contract, after the terms thereof had been
agreed upon in this state, was subsequently reduced to writing
and mailed to Walsh at his residence in North Dakota, and by
him there signed and returned to Bates at Minneapolis, does not
make it a North Dakota contract."
This language, considered with the facts in the case and the
arguments of counsel, may be construed either as meaning that
the contract was made where the negotiations for it took place,
rather than where the last act toward its completion occurred, or
as meaning that the place of making in the sense defined in this
section of the restatement does not determine what law shall
govern the contract. It is certainly a holding that the law of
-Professor Beale in his article, What Law Governs the Validity
of 'a Contract, (1910) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 270. in arguing that the
law of the place of making should always govern, says "Even those
judges and writers who finally lay down the different rule state this,
first, as the natural one." This argument clearly does not apply to
the use of the term "place of contracting" by our court.
8(1909) 109 Minn. 136, 123 N. W 291.
sFinnes v. Selover, Bates & Co., (1907) 102 Minn. 334, 113 N. W
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the place where the last act toward the completion of the contract
is done does not, necessarily, govern the contract.
In the late case of Gilbert v Fosston Manufacturing Co.,' 0
our court used language substantially identical with that of this
section, saying- "They (contracts) are not considered made until
the last act necessary to give them effect has taken place," and
citing McKibben v. Ellingson."' In the cited case the court considered the validity of an assignment for benefit of creditors executed by a North Dakota merchant while in Minneapolis,
transferring the assignor's real and personal property, all of
which was situated in North Dakota, to an assignee living in
Minnesota. After execution, the assignment was recorded in
North Dakota, as required by the statutes of that state, but not
filed with the court in Minnesota. The court held that the final
act which made the assignment effective was the recording and,
since that took place in North Dakota, the contract was made in
that state. The argument of the court in support of this position might be construed as basing the result upon the intention
of the parties, rather than upon a general rule of law
In True v. Northern Pacific R. Co., negotiations for the
sale of Washington land were conducted in Washington. The
contract was submitted to the vendor's land commissioner in
Minnesota for his approval, and then returned to Washington
for formal execution and delivery The court held the contract
was a Washington contract saying that the place of approval by
the commissioner would have been the place where the contract
was made except for the provision for formal execution and
delivery in Washington, which made the contract effective there.
On the whole, we may say that this section of the restatement accords with the Minnesota decisions, though, as will later
be shown, the place of entering into a contract has much less
effect in determining the choice of law in Minnesota than it does
under the Restatement.
Restatement section 334 provides that the contract is made
in a state where the force is set in motion by the last actor who
is a party to the contract. In the case of In re Kahn," the court
considered the validity of an agreement by a Minnesota debtor to
prefer a Wisconsin creditor, performed by delivering to a carrier
10(1927) 174 Minn. 68, 218 N. W 451.

"1(1894) 58 Minn. 205, 59 N. W 1003, 49 Am. St. Rep. 499.
12(1914) 126 Minn. 72, 147 N. W 948.
13(1893) 55 Minn. 509, 57 N. W 154.
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in Minnesota goods for transportation to the Wisconsin creditor.
The court held that, if the action were treated as one on the contract, the Minnesota law made the contract invalid because every
was performed here and those acts did not beact of the debtor
/
come lawful merely because the .title to the goods did not vest
in the creditor until they were delivered to him by the carrier in
Wisconsin, which agrees with the Restatement.
The other nineteen sections in this topic of the Restatement
contain applications of the principle of section 333 to different
fact situations. Our court has had occasion to deal with three
of these fact situations and each time has reached a conclusion in
accord with the Restatement. In Gilbert v. Fosston Mantfacturing Co.,14 the court considered the validity of a sale of bonds
which had been pledged as collateral security for two notes, each
signed in St. Paul but payable in Chicago to a Chicago payee.
The first of these notes was mailed. from St. Paul to the Chicago
payee, the second was handed in St. Paul to an agent of the
payee, but as to both it appeared that the payee had the privilege
of accepting or rejecting the loans, after the notes had actually
reached him. Under these facts the court held that the notes
were Illinois, not Minnesota contracts. Though this seems on
its face contrary to section 357 of the Restatement which states
that when a document embodying a formal contract is to be delivered by mail, the place of contracting is where it is posted, that
section is undoubtedly subject to the qualification stated under
section 348, which contains a similar statement with reference to
the place of making an informal bilateral contract, that the section
does not apply to an offer made to take effect only when the acceptance is received.
Restatement section 341 provides that when an insurance
policy becomes effective on delivery and is delivered to insured
by the agent of the company, the contract is made at the place
of delivery In Anderson v. Royal League,'5 our court cited,
apparently with approval, Coverdale v. Royal Arcanue,26 which
held a benefit insurance contract was made where the certificate
was accepted by the beneficiary whose acceptance in writing was
required, but the case was actually decided on the assumption
the contract was governed by the law of the home state.
14(1927) 174 Minn. 68, 71, 218 N. W 451.

25(1915) 130 Minn. 416, 153 N. W 853, Ann. Cas. 1917C 691.
16(1901) 193 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915.
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Restatement section 349 and Kamper v. Hunter Land Co.,"1
agree in holding that where a contract is -made by an agent, the
place of contracting is where it would have been if the principal
had acted personally where his agent acted, though our court
qualified the holding by adding- "Unless a contrary intention
of the parties is shown or clearly appears from the nature of
of the obligation."
The second topic of this chapter of the Restatement deals
with the creation of a contract. The first section of that topic
reads as follows
"The law of the place of contracting determines the binding
effect of a promise with respect to
(a) The capacity to make the promise,
(b) The necessary form, if any, in which the promise
must be made,
(c) The legal requirements for making a promise binding,
such as consideration, seal, etc.,
(d) The circumstances which make a promise ineffective or
a contract voidable,
(e) The nature of the act to which a party becomes bound,
(f) The time when and the place where the promise is by
its terms to be performed,
(g) The absolute or conditional character of the promise."
The other sections in the topic are mainly applications of the
principle of this section to particular kinds of contracts-sealed
instruments, mercantile instruments, contracts of carriage, informal contracts in general, contracts with regard to land and
contracts creating relations. The Minnesota cases do not, as
a rule, indicate that there is any difference in the proper law which
ought to govern these various types of contracts so that it seems
best to consider all Minnesota cases dealing with the creation of
a contract in connection with this section of the Restatement, unless there is something in the case to indicate that the particular
facts involved influenced the decision.
It is apparent that this section is based on the theory that
the law governing the place where the agreement is completed
is the only law which can attach to the act of completing the
agreement legal obligations so that it becomes a contract.1 8 We
find some statements in Minnesota cases supporting this proposition, but generally they are made in cases where there was no
17(1920) 146 Minn. 337, 178 N. W

747

18 See Beale, What Law Governs Validity of Contract, 23 Harv.
L. Rev. 260, 270.
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-.untroversy as to what was the proper law of the contract.,,
In other similar cases the court has qualified the statement,2 0 or
has applied a law which was the law of the place of performance
as well as of making the contract. 21 In only one case - has the
court applied the law of the place of making the contract as.
against the contention some other law ought to govern and there
it commented on the fact that the adoption of plaintiffs contention
that the law of the place of loss determined the validity 1of a
carrier's agreement limiting its liability would not aid plaintiff
because the proof did not show where the loss occurred. In one
case 23 the law of the place of performance was applied, though
the contract was xmade in this state, and in several cases ' 4 the
court has applied the law which it has found or presumed the
parties intended to choose as the proper law governing the contract.
Mueller v. Ober25 was a suit to foreclose a mortgage given
to secure two promissory notes executed in Iowa by a debtor residing there, payable to plaintiffs, who resided in Wisconsin. The
debtor wrote the notes on Iowa forms which contained a provision for interest at an increased rate if not paid at maturity
He struck out the provision for payment at an Iowa bank and
19 Keenan v. Stimson, (1884) 32 Minn. 377, 20 N. W. 364; Reiff
v. Bakken, (1887) 36 Minn. 333, 31 N. W 348; Midland Co. v. Broat,
(1892) 50 Minn. 562, 52 N. W 972, 17 L. R. A. 312; Powers Merc.
Co. v. Wells-Fargo & Co., (1904) 93 Minn. 143. 100 N. W 735;
Porteous v. Adams Exp. Co., (1911) 115 Minn. 281, 132 N. W 296;
Fiske20 v. Lawton, (1913) 124 Minn. 85, 144 N. W 455.
"The law of the jurisdiction in which the parties to a contract
reside and in which it is executed, especially if it is to be performed
within that jurisdiction, is usually, so far as it affects the substance of
the contract, to be deemed a part of it." Stahl v. Mitchell, (1889)
41 Minn.
325, 335, 43 N. W 385.
2
'Buckley v. Humason, (1892) 50 Minn. 195, 52 N. V 385, 36
Am. St. Rep. 637; Culver v. Johnson, (1915) 131 Minn. 75, 154 N. V
739; Patterson v. Wyman, (1919) 142 Minn. 70, 170 N. W 928; Granite
City 22Bank v. Tvedt, (1920) 146 Minn. 12, 177 N. W 767
Carpenter v. United States Exp. Co., (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139
N. W
23 154.
Ames v. Benjamin, (1898) 74 Minn. 335, 77 N. W 230.
24Thompscn-Houston Elec. Co. v. Palmer, (1892) 52 Minn. 174.
53 N. W. 1137, 38 Am. St. Rep. 536; Smith v. Parsons, (1893) 55
Minn. 520, 57 N. W ,311, Seamans v. Christian Brothers Mill Co.,
(1896) 66 Minn. 205, 68 N. W 1065; Swedish-Amer. Nat'l Bank v.
First -Nat'l Bankl (1903) 89 Minn. 98, 94 N. W 218, 99 Am. St. Rep.
549; Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., (1914) 128 Minn. 30, 150
N. W 229, L. R. A. 1916D 739; Jenkins v. Union Savings Association,
(1916) 132 Minn. 19, 155 N. W 765; Mueller v. Ober, (1927) 172 Minn.
349, 215 N. W 781, Gilbert v. Fosston Mfg. Co., (1827) 174 Minn. 68.
218 N. W 451.
25(1927) 172 Minn. 349, 215 N. W 781.
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inserted the name of a bank in Minnesota as the place of payment.
Neither the increased interest nor the place of payment had been
a matter of agreement between the parties. Under the law of
Minnesota the provision for increased interest would defeat the
right to any interest and the trial court held that law governed
and there was no default. The supreme court stated that the
general rule that the validity of contracts is to be determined
by the laws of the place of performance is based on the presumed
intent of the parties to select that law In this case that presumption is rebutted by the absence of plaintiff's agreement to
the provision making the contract payable in Minnesota, and,
as a general presumption, must yield to the particular presumption that the parties intended to choose a law which would make
their contract valid. The opinon gives no reason for considering
the presumption that the parties intended the law of place of
performance to govern a more general one, than the presumption
that they intended to make a valid contract, and the proposition is
not self evident.
Within two months from the rendition of that opinion, the
court was called upon to decide a similar question in the case of
Gilbert v. Fosston Mfg. Co.2" The controversy was between the
general creditors of an insolvent corporation and the purchaser
of some of the corporate bonds which had been pledged to secure
notes given for money loaned to the company which bonds had
been later sold by the pledgee. The notes provided for seven
per centum interest, the maximum permitted by the laws of
either Minnesota, where the debtor conducted its business, or
Illinois, where the creditor had its principal office and where the
notes were made payable. From the amount stated in the notes,
the lender deducted a substantial sum as bonus or commission.
This made the transaction usurious by the laws of both Minnesota and Illinois, but by the law of the former, the consequence
was the forfeiture of all interest and the principal as well, whereas
by the law of Illinois only the excess interest was forfeited.
After holding that, under the plain facts, the notes were made
in Illinois, not in Minnesota, though the trial court found they
were Minnesota contracts, the court said
"The general rule is that contracts, not relating to real estate
or specific personal property, are governed as to effect and performance by the law of the place where they were made. They
23(1927) 174 Minn. 68, 218 N. W 451.
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are not considered made until the last act necessary to give them
The place where that act takes
effect has taken place.
place therefore becories, no more appearing, the place where the
contract is made. The only alternative is to treat the notes as
having been made in St. Paul but to be performed in Illinois.
That view would bring us to the same end, for it would invoke
well settled' that such contracts
the 'general principle
'are to be governed by the law of the place of performance.'
In the Seeman "7 Case it is observed accurately (quoting Wharton)
that where the bona fide intent of the parties was to fix the situs
of the transaction at a 'place which has a natural and vital connection' with it, and intention to obtain the highest possible legal
interest 'does not prevent the application of the law allowing the
higher rate.' "
It is hard to conceive how a paragraph could have been
framed which would introduce more confusion than this does
into the consideration of a question confusing enough at best.
- In the first place the court is not here faced with a question as to
the effect of performance of a contract, but with the enforceability, that is legal validity, of a promise by a borrower of a
sum of money to repay a larger sum with the maximum legal
rate of interest calculated on the larger sum. If we were dealing
with a question of performance we would not find a "general
rule" that it was governed by the law of the place of making;
even those who apply the latter rule to determine the validity
and interpretation of a contract, apply the law of the place of
performance to determine questions affecting the performance
of the contract..2 8 The "general rule" and "general principle"
which the court invokes to reach the same conclusion on different
-fact hypotheses are inconsistent, they cannot both be the law in
the same jurisdiction. The last portion of the paragraph seems
to rely on the power of the parties to choose which of several
0
possibly-applicable laws shall govern their case." Later portions
of the-plnion discuss this question in greater detail.
The trial court had found that the parties had no actual
intent as to what law should govern the contract. In discussing
this finding the court relied on the policy of the law to achieve
the result intended by the parties and, in referring to the char27Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., (1927)
47 Sup.
28 Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123.

274 U. S. 403,

Restatement secs. 384-396. The case which is probably most
often cited for this distinction is Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank of
(1875) 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245.
Chicago,
2
9Compare Smith v. Parsons, (1893) 55 Minn. 520. 57 N. W 311.
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acterization by an earlier case"0 of the process of imputing to
parties an intent which they-did not possess as a species of legal
jugglery, asserted it was an "honest kind of legerdemain done
in full view of the audience," and one in the interest of honesty,
"only by considering the notes Illinois contracts can we escape
putting the borrowers in the moral category of swindlers."
To continue the figure used by the court, this language is
quite manifestly the "patter" used by the magician to divert the
attention of the audience from the trick he is performing. The
actual situation was that a corporation which was in need of
money and unable to sell its bonds had to agree to the terms imposed upon it by the lender. If we accept the trial court's finding
neither borrower nor lender considered the question of the effect
of the law of either Minnesota or Illinois upon the agreement
they made. The borrower probably intended in good faith to
perform its agreement, in fact did make payments of both principal and interest as long as it was financially able to do so. Now
the question is, not whether the borrower can keep the money,
but whether the lender is entitled to enforce a pledge of assets
to secure the repayment of the loan in preference to the claims
of general creditors. Both Minnesota and Illinois say it is contrary to public policy to permit a lender to impose such terms on
a borrower, Minnesota enforces its policy by refusing to aid a
lender guilty of the prescribed act in collecting either interest or
principal, Illinois merely refuses to aid in collecting the excess
interest. To apply the Minnesota statute would not make the
borrower a swindler any more than to permit one injured by the
violation of a statute to recover double or treble damages makes
that one a swindler, and especially where the benefit goes not
to the borrower but to the general creditors.
It may not be advisable for our court to adopt in all situations the rule of the Restatement that the law of place of making
governs a contract, except as to performance or discharge, it
often would lead to unexpected results where the parties casually
meet and sign the contract in a place where neither of them resides
or does business, it would certainly permit the parties to make any
contract valid if they could find a state whose laws permitted that
contract and there have the contract delivered and accepted by
agents of the parties, 31 but certainly we ought to have decisions
3OGreen v. N. W Trust Co., (1914) 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W 229.
3
Restatement secs. 333, 338.
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based on consistent principles, and not those arrived at by "legerdemain" even if it is "open and honest."
Restatement section 355 repeats in substance the provision
of section 353 (b) that the law of the place of contracting determines the formalities required for making a contract. In
two Minnesota cases 2 in which the court refused to apply the
law of the place where the contract was made to determine questions of essential validity, it intimated that such law might govern the formalities necessary to make the contract binding. But
in Haloran v. Jacob Schnudt Brarg. Co.,33 the court considered
the'sufficiency of a writing to support a guaranty of a lease of
Iowa property executed in Iowa. The writing was sufficient
under the Iowa statute of frauds but not under the Minnesota
statute. The court overruled the contention of defendant that
the question was one of remedy and, therefore, governed by the
law of the forum. Treating it as a question of right the court
said.
"The form of the writing must necessarily be determined
either by the law where the contract is made or where it is to be
performed."
"That particular statute then enters into
the contract, and may be said to form a substantive part thereof."
The decisions in FariersState Bank v. Walch 4 and Goedhard v. Folstad"5 are in accord with the rule in Restatement
section 360 that the law of the place of contracting determines
whether a mercantile instrument is negotiable, but they cannot
be considered -to settle that proposition finally in Minnesota for
in the first of those cases the note was also payable in the 'state
where it was made and in the second no place of payment was
specified.
A similar situation exists with reference to the rule of
Restatement section 364 that the law of the place of contracting
determines what are the provisions and obligations of a mercantile instrument. In Schultz v. Howard3 the question was raised
whether the obligations of parties to a note dated at Chicago and
payable "at Globe National Bank" were joint or several. Counsel
32Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Palmer, (1892) 52 Minn. 174,
52 N. W 1137, 38 Am. St. Rep. 536; Swedish-American Nat'l Bank
v. First Nat. Bank, (1903) 89 Minn. 98, 94 N. W 218, 99 Am. St.
Rep. 549.

33(1917)
34(1916)
35(1923)
36(1895)

137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W 1082, L. R. A. 1917E 777
133 -Minn. 230, 158 N. W 253.
156 Minn. 453, 195 N. W 281.
63 Minn. 196, 65 N. W 363, 56 Am. St. Rep. 470.
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for plaintiff cited in his brief an Illinois statute making all joint
obligations joint and several, but that statute was not pleaded or
proved. The court said
"Assuming that the Globe National Bank, at which the notes
were payable, is in Illinois, this statute, if pleaded, would have
been decisive of the case, for it is settled law that the place of
the contract regulates its validity, interpretation, and the nature
of its obligation."
Since the statute was not pleaded or proved the court assumed the law of Illinois to be the same as that of the common
law of Minnesota. From this it would seem that the "place of
the contract" is the place of performance rather than that of
making.
The first section of the Restatement which deals with informal contracts in general, section 367, provides that the law of
the place of contracting determines whether mutual assent has
been expressed. In Powers Mercantile Co. v Wells-Fargo &
Co.,3 7 our court held that the law of the place of making the
contract determined whether the acceptance of an express receipt
which contained a clause limiting the liability of the carrier in
case of loss amounted to an assent to that as a term of the contract. No contention was made that any other law should apply, 8
the carrier claiming that the evidence showed actual assent to the
limitation. The application of the law of place of making the
contract invalidated the limitation of liability in that case, but
the principle enunciated was applied in two later cases 9 where
the result was to make the limitation valid.
Restatement section 372 states that the law of the place of
the place of contracting determines the binding effect of a promise
to convey land. In a case involving the validity of a pledge of
personal property our court said
37(1904) 93 Minn. 143, 100 N. W 735.
8

S The court did not consider the question whether the rule involved was one of substance as held in some cases, (see Hartman v.

Louisville & N. R. Co., (1890) 39 Mo. App. 88; Coats v. Chicago R. I.
& P R. Co., (1909) 239 Ill. 154, 87 N.E. 929) or one of evidence only
and, therefore, to be governed by the law of the forum, as held in
Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., (1874) 115 Mass. 304. Compare Restatement, Tentative Draft of Conflict of Laws, No. 5, sec. 647 pro-

viding that the law of the forum governs presumptions, and comment

(a) thereunder to the effect that a substantive rule of law stated in
the form
of a presumption is not governed by this rule.
9

3 Porteous v. Adams Exp. Co., (1911)

115 Minn. 281, 132 N. W

296; Carpenter v. United States Exp. Co., (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139

N. W 154.
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"The rule has always been that the validity of contracts and
transactions concerning real property, both as to formality and
essence, is to be determined by the laws of the place where the
property is situated."40
No case has been found which directly raises the question.
In two cases 41 the contract was made in the foreign state where
the land was situated and there was no contention that the law
of that state was not the proper lav to govern the contract. In
another case42 the question was as to the proper law to determine
whether an assumption by a grantee of a mortgage could be
enforced by the holder of the mortgage. The land was located
in Iowa, but the deed was executed in Minnesota. The court held
that the contract of assumption was presumed to be performable
where made since it was silent as to the place of performance, and
that there was nothing to show an intention that the law of Iowa
-should apply, so the court decided the case by applying the law
of Minnesota. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the
assumption agreement was a covenant running with the land
without stating whether that question was to be determined by the
law of the situs of the land, as provided by Restatement section 374.
Comment (b) to Restatement section 372 points out that
the law of the situs of land determines whether a contract to convey the land transfers an interest in the land, while the law of
place of contracting governs the personal rights and obligations
under the contract. This distinction has been recognized by our
court in two cases,'4 but the question involved in each case was
the termination, rather than the validity of the rights and obligations, and in the latter of the cases it is doubtful whether the contract was made in Minnesota, whose law was held to be the
proper law of the contract."
Restatement sections 377-383 comprise Topic III which deals
with the assignment of contractual rights. These sections are
based on the general principle that the assignability of a contract
is determined by the law of the place of contracting, but, if it is
4oSwedish-American Nat'! Bank v. First Nat'!l Bank, (1903) 89
Minn.
4 98, 113, 94 N. W 218, 99 Am. St. Rep. 549.
"lHarris v. McKinley, (1894) 57 Minn. 198, 58 N. W 991, Wood.
(1912) 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. W 746.
v. Johnson,
42
Clement v. Willett, (1908) 105 Minn. 267, 117 N. W 491, 127
Am. St. Rep. 562.

43 Finnes v. Selover, Bates & Co., (1907) 102 Minn. 334, 113 N. W
883; Walsh v. Selover, Bates & Co., (1909) 109 Minn. 136, 123 N.
W 291.
44See comment on Restatement sec. 333, supra.
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assignable, the assignment is governed by the law of the place
of assignment. No Minnesota cases appear to have involved any
of the principles of this topic. In two cases" our court has
had to pass on assignments for the benefit of creditors where
foreign operative facts were present but in both cases the controversy related to the title to tangible chattels, not to contractual
obligations.
In Lewt, s v Bush" an assignee under an Illinois assignment
intervened in Minnesota garnishment proceedings, claiming priority over the plaintiff though he had not notified the debtors as
required by Illinois law to make the assignment fully effective.
The court applied the Minnesota rule as to notice because the
question did not concern the contract of assignment, which
might be governed by the law of the place where it was made,
but the remedy, which was governed by the law of the forum.
Topic IV of the Restatement, containing sections 384-396,
relates to the performance of contracts. Section 384 and the
comments under it define the term "place of performance." In
no Minnesota case has there been any controversy as to where a
contract is to be performed, but in Clement v. Willeit" our
court stated that if no place of performance is specified a contract
is presumed to be performed where made, which accords with
comment (a) of this section of the Restatement. No intimation
is given by the Restatement as to what is the .place of performance
of a promise which is performable in more than 'one place, such
as a promise to carry goods through several states. Our court
answered a contention that the law of place of performance determined the validity of a limitation of carrier's liability for loss of
goods it undertook to transport from New York to Minnesota
by stating that the weight of authority was against the contention
and that it was unavailing since the proof did not show where
the loss occurred, 48 thereby intimating the place of performance
was the place where the carrier was performing when the breach
occurred, not the place of final performance by delivery to the
consignee.
45In re Paige & Sexsmitli Lumber Co., (1883) 31 Minn. 136. 16
N. W 700; Swedish-American Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, (1903)
89 Minn. 98, 94 N. W 218, 99 Am. St. Rep. 549.
46(1883) 30 Minn. 244, 15 N. W 113.
47(1908) 105 Minn. 267 117 N. W 491.

4sCarpenter v. United States Express Co.. (1912)
139 N. IV 154.
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Restatement section 385 reads as follows
"The law of the place of performance governs the perforinance of the promie with respect to
(a) The manner of performance,
(b) The tune and locality of performance,
(c) The person or persons by whom or to whom performance shall be made or rendered,
(d) The sufficiency of performance,
(e) The discharge of the obligation,
(f) The breach of the obligation."
In Lezms v. Bush45 and Johison v. Nelson5O our court stated,
in harmony with this section, that the general rule was that as to
performance of contracts the law of place of performance governs,
but the statements were dicta in both cases, and in the later case
the authority cited 5t f o r this statement was a case which involved
usury, that is -the validity, not the performance of the contract.
In other cases our court has held or intimated that the law of
the place of performance determines the validity of a contract.52
Generally our court seems to proceed on the assumption that
there is one proper law of the contract. Thus in three cases"
in which the question has been the termination of rights under a
contract for the sale of land, which under subdivision (e) of this
.section of the Restatement would be governed 4 by the law of
the place of performance, the court speaks of the law governing
the contract without any intimation that the discharge of the
contract may be governed by a law other than that which governs
its formation and validity In the recent case of Gilbert v. Fosstow Manufacturnig Co.,55 the court said
"The general rule is that contracts, not relating to real estate
or specific personal property, are governed as to effect and performance by the law of the place where they were made."
The question before the court in that case was the validity,
not the performance, of a contract, but the statement confirms the
49(1883) 30 Minn. 244, 15 N. W 113.

50(1915)o 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W 620.
51
Ames
52

v. Benjamin, (1898) 74- Minn. 335, 77 N. W 230.
Supra, notes 21 and 23.
Finnes v. Selover, Bates & Co., (1907) 102 Minn. 334, 113 N.
W 883; Walsh v. Selover, Bates & Co., (1909) 109 Minn. 136, 123 N. W
291, 54
True v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1914) 126 Minn. 72, 147 N. W 948.
That is, if we accept the theory on which all those opinions
proceed that the question of the applicability of the Minnesota statute
which provides for the termination of the rights of a purchaser under a contract for'the purchase of land is a question concerned with
the termination of contract rights rather than of interests m land.
55(1927) 174 Minn. 68, 218 N. W 451.
53
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view indicated by earlier cases that our court draws no distinction
between the law governing performance of a contract, and that
governing other questions relating to the contract.
Restatement section 387 reads as follows
"If performance of a contract is illegal by the law of the
place of performance at the time for performance, there is no
obligation to perform so long as the illegality continues. If the
illegality of performance is temporary and the obligation of the
contract still continues by the law of the place of contracting, the
contract must be performed within a reasonable time after its
performance becomes legal."
This section would not apply where the performance is merely unenforceable by the law of the place of performance so that
our cases5 6 which enforce payment of an instrument which is
usurious by the law of the place of payment are not contrary to it.
The illustrations given under this section in the Restatement are
all cases where the performance has become illegal after the
contract was entered into, but comment (e) implies that the section
is also applicable where the performance was illegal at the time
it was entered into, for that comment states that "If by the law
of the place of performance the performance is illegal at the
time the contract is made, the contract itself by the law of the
place of contracting is void by the law of several states." That
is, if a contract is entered into in Indiana, to stage a prize fight
in Illinois in a manner prohibited by the laws of the latter state,
and action is brought in Minnesota to compel the payment of
training expenses, or of any other sum payable before the fight,
so that the obligation to pay cannot be construed as conditioned
on performance by the other party, Minnesota ought to hold the
contract valid and give the relief asked unless it found that the
local law of Indiana, as distinguished from its rules of conflict
of laws, holds that a contract made there to do an act in another
state is void if the act is prohibited by the law of the state where
it is to be performed, and it ought to give such relief even though
it knows there is no obligation to perform the act called for. This
result is a logical deduction from the principle that only the law
of the place where the contract is made can determine its validity,
but it is safe to predict that no court would adhere to logic to
such an extent. If we can assume that all jurisdictions which
56

Smith v. Parsons, (1893)

55 Minn. 520, 57 N. W 311, Green

v. N. W Trust Co., (1914) 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W 229, L. R. A.
1916D 739.
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follow the Restatement of Conflict of Laws will also follow the
Restatement of Contracts, and we include in the latter a provision
that a contract to do an act wuch is prohibited by the law of the
state where it is to be done is invalid, the practical difficulty will
disappear, but it seems it would be simpler and more effective
to recognize that rule as one of conflict of laws, which is an
exception to the general principle that the law of the place of
making governs.
Restatement, section 390 provides that the law of the place of
performance governs the postponement of performance by operation of law. Hewitt v. Dredge 7 was an action on notes executed and payable in Minnesota, but secured by mortgage on
lands in Canada. The defense was the Canadian moratorium act.
The court held it was too plain for argument that the notes were
Minnesota contracts and the Canadian act could not affect an
action on them. There was no intimation that this particular
question was to be determined by a different principle from that
which determines the proper law of the contract.
Restatement section 392 reads as follows
"The law of the place of performance determines whether
the obligation of a contract is discharged by the giving and acceptance of a promissory note or bill of exchange."
The question came before our court in the case of ThompsonHoidton Electrc Co. v. Palmer" and our court decided it in
accordance with the proper law of the second contract, not of the
original contract. This decision, rather than the quoted section
of the Restatement seems consistent with the principles on which
the rest of the Restatement is based. The question is whether
one of the terms of the contract for the giving and acceptance
of the note or bill of exchange is that the prior obligation shall
be discharged. To be consistent with other parts of the Restatement,5 9 this section ought to be limited to discharge by operation
of law, but no law provides that a debtor may discharge a debt
by giving a negotiable instrument for the amount. If the instrument is given it is because of an agreement subsequent to the
57(1916) 133 Minn. 171, 157 N. W 1080.
5s(1892) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W 1137, 38 Am. St. Rep. 536. In
this case it was not necessary to distinguish between the agreement
to give and accept the note, and the promise to pay, embodied in the
note. Where different laws would properly apply to those agreements,
the proper law of the former ought to determine what term shall be
supplied-in
it with reference to its effect on the prior obligation.
59
Compare Restatement sec. 390, supra.
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debt to give and accept it, and the parties may by that agreement
determine whether the prior debt is to be discharged or continued.
If they do not provide for that in the agreement, the law must
determine the question for them, but it ought to be the law which
would supply the necessary clause of any contract made under
the circumstances which surrounded the making of the contract
to give and accept the instrument and not the law which governs
the discharge by operation of law of the original contract.
In Topic V of the Restatement which treats of the discharge
of the obligation of a contract, the first section, 397, reads as
follows
"The law of the place of performance determines whether
a release of one party to an obligation or extending the time for
performance in favor of the principal party, or surrendering security, discharges the other parties."
A question somewhat analagous to this was presented in
Merchants State Bank v. Sunset Orchard Laird Co.,10 an action
against guarantors of a note made and payable in Minnesota but
secured by mortgage on Montana land which had been foreclosed.
The defense was that a statute of Montana required all liability
on the note to be determined in the foreclosure suit. The court
held the note was a Minnesota contract, making no distinction
between the law which would govern the question of discharge and
that which would govern other questions relating to the contract.
It also held the Montana statute was a regulation of procedure
and, therefore would not apply to an action in Minnesota.
Topic VI, the last topic of this chapter of the Restatement,
deals with breach of contract, applying the law of the place of
performance to the questions involved. The only provision of
this topic which has been involved in a Minnesota case is that
of section 403, that the law of the place of performance determines the measure of damages for breach. In Kolliner v. Western
Uinon Tel. Co.,61 plaintiff sought to recover the cost of a trip to
Washington which was made futile by defendant's failure to deliver a telegram which he sent from the train in Montana to an
addressee in Washington.
Under a Minnesota statute such
damages could be recovered. Plaintiff did not argue the question
of the proper law to govern. Defendant argued that it must be
either the law of Montana where the contract was made or Wash00(1924) 158 Minn. 108, 196 N. W 963.
61(1914) 126 Minn. 122, 147 N. W 961, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1180.
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ington where it was to be performed and since neither Montana
nor Washington law was pleaded, the question must be governed
by the common law as interpreted in Minnesota. The court, in
deciding for defendant, said.
"The contract was made in Montana, and there was no pleading or proof as to the,statutes of that state."
In view of the facts and the argument this case is probably
not authority against the Restatement, but it is another, and very
striking illustration, of our court's failure to notice that different
questions arising out of a contract may be governed by different
laws.
From this comparison of our cases with the Restatement it
is apparent that the latter proceeds on the theory that the law of
the place where the contract was made determines all questions as
to the formation and obligation of the contract, and the law of
the place of performance governs all questions as to the performance, discharge or breach of the contract, while our court,
in so far as it follows -any consistent theory,. applies the law
chosen by the parties, actually or presumptively, as the law to
govern all questions arising out of the contract. The fact that
in many of our cases the result agrees with that which would be
reached by applying the Restatement is merely accidental. It
is hardly to be expected that our court will discard the theory
which it has so often followed in the past for one which it has
expressly refused to apply in numerous cases. In fact, it may
well be argued that the strict application of the theory of the
Restatement in all cases would make our law too rigid to be
practicable. But it is to be hoped that our court, with the logical
analysis in the Restatement of the various questions involved in
this-intricate field before it, will be led to make a more careful
analysis of the problems involved and supplant the chaotic condition of our law today with a practically, if not logically, consistent body of rules, which will enable the lawyer to advise his
client, with some degree of confidence, what law will be held to
govern the various questions which arise out of a contract into
which the client has entered, or desires to enter.

